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A post-civil war country may cease military activity, but the social rupture impacts political 
discourse and ethnic relations, and can lead to collective violence against minorities. Sri Lanka 
has witnessed multiple examples of anti-Muslim sentiment and violence since the civil war 
termination, most infamously in 2014 when ethnic riots affected large numbers of people. 
Buddhist monks appeared to play a prominent role. The lengthy war and ethnonationalist 
ideologies have produced politico-religious shifts associated with ‘Buddhist extremism’, 
implicated in these riots and other aggressions. This paper uses interview data to explore the 
question: what causal mechanisms link post-civil war and extremist ideologies, and how this 
can lead to ethnic rioting. Interview respondents argue that promoting a monolithic national 
identity in a heterogeneous country enhances divisions, which can be politically expedient. An 
outright war victory, militarization of society and lack of peacebuilding sustain ethnic tensions 
that can be mobilized for further anti-minority violence. 
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1: Introduction  
 
In recent years, Sri Lanka has experienced a rise in anti-Muslim sentiment and organized 
violence. One study1 lists more than 650 separate attacks on Sri Lankan Muslims just from 2011 
to 2015. The anti-Muslim aggression shows some level of mobilization and is not confined to 
geographically localized areas. One of the most significant instances of violence occurred in 
2014 when deadly ethnic riots mostly targeted Muslims, affecting tens of thousands of people. 
This paper uses data from a series of interviews with religious leaders from the 
country’s four major religions, undertaken shortly after the 2014 ethnic riots, to investigate how 
Buddhist extremism and ideologies of nationalism in Sri Lanka are linked to outbreaks of 
communal violence against ethnic minorities, particularly Muslims, in the post-civil war 
environment. Conflict can produce political victimization and scapegoating of minorities that 
continues after a successful military victory, as civil war creates damaging long-term legacies 
for inter-group relations which may be deepened in the absence of any rigorous reconciliation 
processes. The Sri Lanka case illustrates how certain ethnicities are ‘securitized’ and considered 
by state apparatus and non-state actors to be a potential or manifest threat to the nation.  
The war between the state and the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
created long-lasting divisions and mistrust that affected all the ethnic and religious groups in 
the country. The causal factors of the civil war were not originally linked explicitly to religion 
and were based on ethno-territorial claims, reference to historical events and perceived 
discrimination in the twentieth century, both during and following the British colonial period. 
The argument presented here is that legacies from the civil war, militarization of society, unitary 
nationalist identities and valediction of violence have deepened long-lasting trauma and 
divisions between the country’s social groups (ethnic, national and religious). This has 
contributed to the phenomenon of using communal violence against minorities, and hyper-
nationalism feeding into that discriminatory and targeted violence. These elements existed both 
before and during the war, but have been adapted and augmented in the post-war socio-political 
environment.  
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This paper contextualizes the current anti-Muslim bias through examining the 
aftermath of the civil war and recent ethnic riots, and the contested positions of Buddhism and 
Sinhalese nationalism in Sri Lankan society. The primary research question here is: what causal 
mechanisms link a post-war environment with religious and nationalist extremism, and how 
can this lead to outbreaks of ethnic rioting? The interview respondents overwhelmingly argue 
that the legacies of the civil war, and a political environment that promotes nationalism and 
triumphalism, are explicitly connected to the anti-Muslim ethnic riots. This environment 
appears to be facilitated and enabled through a biased media, distortion of religious teachings 
in public discourse and tacit government acceptance.  
This article proceeds in seven sections. Following this introduction, the next section 
discusses the research methodology and data collection processes. The third section is an 
overview of previous research covering civil war legacy, Sri Lankan Buddhism and 
nationalism, and ethnic riots. The fourth section examines the phenomenon of anti-Muslim 
violence and its linkages with the termination of the civil war. The fifth section explores some 
characteristics of Sri Lankan Buddhist extremism and nationalism and contextualizes these with 
regard to the civil war and the post-conflict environment. The sixth section gives an overview 
of the connections between post-war relations, the mainstream media, and the government’s 
position regarding the ethnic violence. The seventh and final section provides concluding 
remarks on the arguments presented here; that the causes of ethnic riots and religious extremism 
are primarily embedded in ethno-political grievances, particularly in a volatile post-conflict 
environment.   
 
2: Research Methodology and Data Collection  
 
In the capital city Colombo, and Galle, a major town in the South West, the author conducted 
16 interviews with leaders and activists of different faith organisations, and two religiously-
inspired non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in peacebuilding and conflict 
transformation activities. The four major faiths in Sri Lanka were all represented: Buddhists, 
Christians, Muslims2 and Hindus. There was also a focus group discussion comprising six 
representatives from Buddhism, Catholicism and Islam.  
The Buddhists were mostly ordained monks3, and the Christians were ordained 
Catholic priests. Hindu ordination is less formalistic, but their priests are known as kapurāla or 
kapuwa in Sinhala. The Catholic respondents referred to themselves interchangeably as 
Christians or Catholics and this paper does likewise. ‘Faith’ and ‘religion’ are used 
interchangeably here. The interviews were normally held in the respondent’s place of worship 
or in an office, but all were private and no members of the public were present.  
Several respondents were recommended to the author by their own peers, in a standard 
snowballing selection process that facilitated engagement with actors involved in fostering 
peaceful relations. The interviews were generally conducted in English, but a Sri Lankan field 
assistant helped with translation as needed and was also instrumental in contacting potential 
interviewees in advance. None of the respondents represent extremist groups and all of them 
were identified through their activities against the culture of conflict and ideologies of violence. 
Many of them explicitly stated that Buddhist extremists would not consent to an interview with 
a researcher, particularly a foreigner, and that even attempting to meet such people could pose 
a security risk.  
Many of the arguments presented here come from these various faith-based actors 
opposed to extremist organisations such as the ‘Bodu Bala Sena’ [BBS- Buddhist Power Army]. 
This is a Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist group that promotes anti-Muslim boycotts, agitates 
against halal foods and Muslim dress, and has been implicated in violence against the country’s 
ethnic minorities. The BBS is an extremist fringe; many of Sri Lanka’s other Buddhist 
organisations (such as the National Bhikku4 Front) are in opposition to the values held by the 
BBS. 
A research design such as this may be subject to methodological defects, as it is heavily 
dependent on interview data and does not examine documents or publications in Tamil or 
Sinhala. English-speaking respondents are more likely to be educated and may hold more 
liberal political views, and those who are not fluent in English may struggle to express their 
feelings fully and accurately, which could reduce the objectivity of the data. The interview 
respondents do not claim to offer a dispassionate and objective overview of the BBS and its 
activities. As only a minority of domestic faith organisations are overtly involved in conflict 
transformation work5, these respondents are not representative of the average religious leader 
and their views are not indicative of the average member of any particular faith. Instead, 
individuals were actively sought with a critical and informed view of recent religious extremism 
and who claim to be unafraid of criticizing the government, if as they suggest, it was implicated 
in fomenting ethno-nationalist ideologies. Given the political sensitivity of the subject and the 
potential for further violence, around half the respondents requested anonymity and several 
claimed to be in danger from being targeted by extremists6. However, full anonymity was 
provided for all respondents and their names, ethnicities and organizations are not referred to 
here. Only their religious affiliation has been recorded.  
The interviews were open-ended and semi-structured, and lasted between 60 and 90 
minutes. The prompting questions covered the influence, rise and impact of Buddhist 
extremism, and the victimization and scapegoating of Muslims. Other questions explored 
relations with government and other religions; the strengths, approaches and limitations of faith 
leaders; and challenges and future developments for peacebuilding and dialogue, all within the 
context of post-war violence against Muslims in general and particularly the ethnic riots of 
summer 2014. Notes from each interview were shared afterwards with the relevant respondents 
to check accuracy and ensure that the transcripts reflect what each interviewee intended to say. 
With regard to the author’s positionality, he previously worked in Sri Lanka from 2005 to 2007 
for humanitarian aid agencies implementing post-Tsunami reconstruction programmes mostly 
in the North and East of the country with communities from Tamil, Sinhalese and Muslim 
backgrounds.  
 
3: Review of Previous Research  
 
 The distinction between religious and ethnic identity is often fluid, and there is evidence that 
ethnic conflicts are more intractable and long-lasting than non-ethnic conflicts.7 Similarly, 
political grievance is a more salient factor in civil war than ethnic division alone;8 ‘conflicts 
last longer when ethnicity is charged with ethnonationalist grievances’.9 Military activity may 
cease following a civil conflict, but collective memories preserve the legacies of violence.10 
The damage that civil war causes can increase the chances for protracted conflict and persistent 
violence, which Collier labels the ‘conflict trap’.11 
Ethnic and nationality boundaries in Sri Lanka are not consistent, but there is some 
overlap. Ethnicity here refers to three main groups: the Sinhalese majority, Tamils, and 
Muslims. Although Muslims generally speak Tamil as a first language they comprise a distinct 
social group, where their ethnicity and faith are often conflated. Some Muslims may identify 
as ethnically Tamil, meaning there are non-Tamils who speak Tamil in the country. Although 
Sinhalese and Tamils have often blamed each other for creating the conditions for war,12 
Sinhalese Buddhists’ perceptions of threats to their identity in their own ‘homeland’ was a key 
factor in the conflict.13 Ethnicity is a highly emotive and integral factor in personal and group 
identity, being ‘based on a myth of collective ancestry’.14 Anderson15 likewise argues that a 
nation comprises an ‘imagined’ community, based on the shared perceptions of its members, 
of who is within the nation, and who is outside of it; group anxieties and frustrations may be 
subsumed under discourses of ethnic survival and threatened identities. As Holt frames it, how 
can minorities fully belong in a state that insists on ‘religious, cultural and linguistic 
homogenization?’16 
Horowitz uses Sri Lanka as a prime example in his argument that ethnically-related 
conflicts tend to be intractable.17 This is due to pervasive and lengthy rivalries between ethnic 
groups engaged in zero-sum power struggles that see their interests being challenged; ethnicity 
and religion are frequently conflated as a marker of ‘otherness’.  
Issues that are collectively referred to as the ‘Muslim Question’18 were overshadowed 
by the war and the violence of LTTE separatism, and the suffering, displacement and loss of 
Sri Lanka’s Muslims have not been sufficiently acknowledged in the post-conflict era. Sri 
Lankan Muslims tended to oppose the separatism of Tamil Eelam19 and sought to preserve the 
country’s territorial integrity.20 Muslims in Sri Lanka are not the only social group experiencing 
discrimination, as Christians and Hindus have been persecuted by Sinhalese ethno-nationalists, 
but on a smaller scale.21  
Devotta22 traces the erosion of the country’s democratic institutions and the imposition 
of increasingly authoritarian governance to the outbreak and lengthy duration of the civil war. 
The institutionalization of identity politics, and state rule that sharply divided Sinhalese and 
Tamil were major causes for the civil war. It was not primarily a religious conflict; the separatist 
ideology of the LTTE was based on ethnic rather than religious identity and the significance of 
faith was secondary to ethno-historical grievance as a causal factor in the war.23 
Targets for grievances and scapegoating may be displaced onto other groups, whereby 
a multitude of social evils are projected along with justifications for violent action.24 Sri Lanka’s 
war was notable for the number of accusations on both sides of deliberate targeting of civilians: 
Tamils, Sinhalese and Muslims.25 The practice of targeting civilians is noted for its influence 
on conflict duration.26  
Mainstream conflict resolution theory holds that conflicting parties will benefit from a 
negotiated settlement, and that preventing conflict would be in their own interests.27 However, 
in Sri Lanka the triumphant Rajapakse government demonstrated little or no political will to 
address the root causes of the war or confront issues of political reform, but instead focused on 
consolidating power and suppressing opposition.28 These triumphalist and authoritarian 
ideologies have been tolerated and promoted in Sri Lanka’s post-conflict environment,29 and 
this ‘victor’s peace’ has eroded political space for meaningful reconciliation and interethnic 
peacebuilding.30  
British colonial policy prioritized centralized executive and legislative control over 
power-sharing among ethnic groups, which often resulted in a unitary state operating within a 
multi-ethic society.31 The military victory over the LTTE ended any power-sharing discourse 
and permitted an aggressive and nationalistic agenda that endorsed the use of armed violence 
over negotiations or dialogue for conflict transformation,32 and the rights and dignity of 
minority ethnic groups have not been adequately protected.33  
When examining the national identity of modern Sri Lanka, the image of the ‘nation’ 
rests primarily on a foundation of (re)constructing a Sinhalese Buddhist identity.34 However, 
while Buddhists are the majority religious group, they are not overwhelmingly dominant 
demographically. The 2012 census recorded Sri Lanka’s population of 20 million as 70.1 per 
cent Buddhist, with the Sinhalese population at 74.9 per cent. Muslims were 9.7 per cent. 
Catholics and other Christians comprised 7.6 per cent and Hindus were 12.6 per cent.35 The 
Muslim population of nearly 10 per cent comprises several distinct ethnicities such as Malay, 
Moor and Tamil. Beyond their faith, these groups may have little in common and there has been 
minimal progress towards a unified national identity of Islam,36 in contrast to Sri Lankan 
Buddhism for example. The country’s Muslims are thus highly heterogeneous despite the 
history and influence of ethno-nationalism and conflict.37 Domestic accusations against 
Muslims have tended to focus on their economic power, higher birthrates, halal cruelty, and the 
globalization of political Islam.38 
Uncovering the linkages between historical events and current lived experiences is 
essential to understand how religious identities are articulated.39 In Sri Lanka’s case, this 
pertains most pertinently to the sacred Buddhist texts, the origin myth of the Sinhalese people 
and the foundations of the religion. The main such text is the Mahavamsa, which although not 
canonical, was written in Sri Lanka and relates specifically to the importance of the island’s 
religious role in affirming its historical identity as a Buddhist nation. In Pali, Sri Lanka is named 
Dhammadipa (island of Buddhist teachings) and Sinhadipa (island of the Sinhalese).40 A strict 
interpretation of such scripture leaves little cultural or social space for non-Buddhist minorities, 
and furthermore leads to claims that Sinhalese Buddhism should be protected,41 as Sri Lanka is 
the only place where that faith now exists, unlike all the other religions present on the island 
which have homelands elsewhere. This contributes to Sri Lankan Buddhist perceptions of 
persecution and claims of both internal and external threats.42  
Ethnic riots occur in politically charged environments. Scholarly analyses of ethnic riot 
causation highlight the salience of political uncertainty and transitions.43 As non-random 
events, they are simultaneously both organized and contain spontaneous elements. While riots 
often overlap with street protests in academic studies,44 there is consensus that much depends 
on the type and timeliness of state response;45 to what extent the state accommodates, prevents 
or encourages ethnic group violence. Cases from Indonesia suggest that ethnic riots tend to 
occur in ethnically divided districts, experiencing weak local-level political engagement, and 
continued dominance of a government regime.46 Security forces such as the Police, and local 
officials, have a significant influence in either preventing or tolerating ethnic riots.47 Hindu-
Muslim riots in India, which have a long history, occur more often when political parties do not 
consider that they need to rely on minority votes (Muslims, in this case), and ethnic riots there 
can be politically expedient for elected politicians.48  
 
4. Anti-Muslim violence and the termination of the civil war  
 
In June 2014, Sri Lanka witnessed a severe eruption of ethnic rioting primarily targeting 
Muslims, more severe than the anti-minority hate incidents that had occurred over the previous 
few years. The main affected areas were Aluthgama, Beruwala and Dharga Town in Kalutara 
District in the South West of the island, at the opposite end of the country from the areas of the 
civil war in the North and East. Around 10,000 people were displaced by the rioting, 80 per 
cent of them Muslims.49 Four people were killed, 80 injured and large numbers of houses and 
businesses were destroyed. This violence attracted international attention, which was partly due 
to parallels with similar anti-Muslim attacks in Myanmar50 and partly due to the prominent and 
visible role played by saffron-robed Buddhist monks.51 Throughout the war years, extremist 
Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka had been notorious for attacking peace demonstrations, 
opposition political party rallies and religious minorities.52  
The government imposed curfews across several towns, but in general the security 
forces were slow to respond. Even four days after the rioting, no arrests had been made. The 
BBS was accused of being overtly involved in the physical violence and mobilizing rioters, but 
it vehemently denied organizing the Aluthgama rally on 15 June 2014 where violent rioting 
broke out53 and has consistently rejected being responsible for any of the violence. The 
country’s leader at the time, President Rajapakse, publicly blamed foreign forces for the 2014 
riots, claiming that they threaten post-war peace and reconciliation in the country, without 
specifically identifying who they are or why they wished to harm Sri Lanka.54  
Unlike the LTTE for example, Muslim organisations in Sri Lanka have no history of 
agitating for secession or territorial autonomy. There is very little history of violent Islamic 
extremism on the island and only weak circumstantial and unsubstantiated evidence for the 
presence of foreign or domestic Jihadis.55 Sri Lankan Islam is notable more for factionalism 
and intra-Muslim struggles.56 Despite this, then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapakse, who 
is President Rajapakse’s brother, had claimed that the country was vulnerable to Muslim 
extremism and that Islamic radicals had been discovered there.57 In contrast, evidence emerged 
in 2014 of communications and visits between Buddhist extremists in Sri Lanka and those 
operating in Myanmar.58 In October 2014, formal ties appear to have been established between 
the Buddhist extremist group ‘969’ operating in Myanmar, and the BBS, following a joint 
meeting in Sri Lanka’s capital.59 Both these groups claim that Buddhism is under threat 
globally. President Rajapakse granted the 969 monk leader Ashin Wirathu a visa in September 
2014, despite protests by Islamic organizations and other Sri Lankan civil society groups.  
Under President Rajapakse, the state was victorious over the LTTE in 2009, ending 26 
years of civil war. The war terminated with massive destruction of life and bombing of civilian 
areas, events which are still highly contested. The Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) rejected 
appeals for an international inquiry and announced it would conduct its own inquiry that would 
be impartial and independent, despite the fact that it was one of the warring parties.60 The 
Rajapakse government then carried out the ‘Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission’ 
examining the final stages of the war. This was denounced as lacking impartiality and rigour 
by various international human rights organizations.61  
In March 2014, the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted a resolution62 to 
investigate allegations that Sri Lankan troops had killed up to 40,000 non-combatants during 
the final stages of the war. Further war crime allegations included rape as a weapon of war, 
desecration of dead bodies, shelling of hospitals and areas identified by the Red Cross as no-
fire zones, and extra-judicial killings of surrendered LTTE fighters. As a result, relations 
between UN agencies and the Sri Lankan government became tense, with criticisms and 
charges being levelled by both. During his decade as President (2005-2015), Rajapakse 
repeatedly denied any allegations of government war crimes or deliberate targeting of 
civilians.63  
Within Sri Lanka’s militarized society, various administrations, most conspicuously 
the Rajapakse regime, legitimized the use of violence as a problem solving mechanism, and 
gave a clear demonstration of its efficacy by defeating the LTTE after three decades of war, 
which no previous Sri Lankan government had managed to do. This resulted in significant 
levels of popularity and political capital for the Rajapakse government.64 With ethnic Tamil 
separatism removed as a threat (the Tamil National Alliance, the largest Tamil political party 
in the country, dropped its demands for a separate state in 2010), the Rajapakse government 
sought to consolidate the Sinhalese vote bank. More than half the interview respondents 
claimed that the government endeavored to stay in power through scapegoating and 
highlighting the threat from a different ethnic group, namely Muslims, following its success in 
defending the country from the LTTE threat. The 2010 General Election was comprehensively 
won by Rajapakse on a wave of post-war relief, and economic growth in the Southern and 
Central areas of the island.  
The Rajapakse government sought to minimize international censure of its military 
operations through emphasizing the nature of its struggle against an intransigent terrorist 
enemy, which necessitated activities beyond the mandate of accepted legal norms in times of 
war.65 The state enjoyed such a level of popular support to terminate the war with a military 
victory, coupled with the lack of third-party observers or forces, that it was able to impose both 
a defeat on the LTTE and continue the suppression of ethnic minority rights. The government 
deepened its militarization of Sri Lankan society and consolidated state power, without 
requiring recourse to any political settlement or negotiation.66 This military victory established 
the basis for continued persecution of minority groups, under the same discourse of 
consolidating the Sinhala Buddhist nation against internal enemies67.  
 
5. Buddhist Nationalism in Sri Lankan Society and post-war tensions  
 
Sri Lanka is an ancient nation state and its Buddhists often consider the island to be home to a 
‘pure Buddhism’.68 Theravada Buddhists69 have traditionally maintained that their religion 
represents the Buddha’s teachings in a more authentic form. However, while Theravada 
Buddhism enjoys demographic supremacy and state patronage, Sri Lanka does celebrate 
various religious festivals from different traditions, religious schools from all faiths are eligible 
to receive government spending, and Buddhist temples often feature Hindu iconography and 
shrines. This presence, and toleration, of multiple religions in the island, is not for example 
analogous to the situation in several Islamic countries, which prohibit even the construction of 
other faiths’ shrines or the import of their religious texts.  
The recent waves of anti-Muslim violence in Sri Lanka need to be contextualized 
within the broader religious and conflictual history of the island. Kapferer’s pioneering study70 
in 1988 was one of the first to claim a link between some of the norms and values pervading 
Sinhalese social life, nationalist ideologies, and Sri Lanka’s numerous examples of collective 
ethnic violence. The ‘deep hegemony’ of Sinhalese nationalism and the salience of a monolithic 
ethnic identity contributed both to the multiple failed peace talks during the war and the 
subsequent lack of power sharing.71 Despite almost a millennium of peaceful relations between 
Muslims and Sinhalese, unparalleled in Asian history72, modern Sri Lankan Buddhism has an 
ideological basis which overtly makes reference to its purity in ancient times, allowing its 
practice and ideologies to be distorted in the modern era73 through reference to an ‘imagined’ 
previous state of virtuousness. Similar reimagining occurs in all religions, but it is a key aspect 
of Buddhism that links it to broader conflictual dynamics on the island. The use of state-
sanctioned violence to ‘protect’ Buddhism has a long history in different regions, and the 
situation in Sri Lanka does have historical precedents elsewhere.74  
The overt conflation of Buddhism with Sinhalese culture and Sri Lankan nationalism 
started around the second half of the nineteenth century.75 During the 20th century following 
independence from British colonial rule, this link was made explicit.76 From 1972, the Jathika 
Sangha Sammelanaya [National State Assembly] made alterations to the Constitution that 
elevated the position of Sinhalese language and Buddhism. In Sri Lanka’s Constitution, 
Buddhism has the ‘foremost place’ in society, and it is the duty of the State to protect and foster 
it.77 The combination of Buddhist nationalism and ethnocentrism has been institutionalized as 
state policy, but the British colonial administration is partly responsible for laying the 
foundation of Sinhalese grievances through perceived discrimination against Buddhism.78  
Sri Lanka has a political party comprising Buddhist monks, the Jathika Hela Urumaya 
[JHU: National Sinhalese Heritage Party, founded in 2004]. It was formed by monks with 
nationalistic ideals of territorial integrity and a refusal to concede any land to the LTTE, even 
as part of a peace process. The rise of the JHU highlights the divisive and long-term impacts of 
the civil war, which significantly affected Sri Lankan polity and eroded the governance 
structures that had previously established the country as a regional leader in political 
representation, inclusivity and democratic legitimacy. Of the JHU’s 12 main doctrines, the first 
is that Sri Lanka should be ruled according to Buddhist principles and the government’s 
principal duty is to protect the Buddhist religion. The BBS was established by monks who broke 
away from the JHU in 2004. Such divisions draw attention to the lack of a unified voice in 
contemporary Sri Lankan Buddhism.79 The BBS headquarters in Colombo were formally 
inaugurated by President Rajapakse in 2011. However, the BBS has faced increased criticism, 
especially since the 2014 Aluthgama violence.80   
Buddhism in Sri Lanka has been co-opted through an aggressive militarism that 
simultaneously sees itself as a victim, and justifies aggression in response to its perceived 
victim status. Following the argument in Bartholomeusz’s “just-war” analysis,81 some 
Buddhists perceive their religion to be under attack from a variety of threats, and can therefore 
justify using violence to defend it. This cognitive dissonance, of Sinhalese Buddhism’s dearth 
of meaningful contributions to the formation of a nonviolent ideologies within Sri Lanka, has 
been explored by Uyangoda.82 Mainstream Sri Lankan Buddhism extols its nonviolent virtues 
while often not translating those ideals into concrete behaviour for its adherents. Within the 
faith, there is tension between those believers that adhere to strict nonviolence, and those who 
paradoxically rationalize armed violence as a means to defend it. The apparently self-
contradictory philosophy is that promoting a safe and protected environment for Buddhism 
allows it to continue practicing nonviolence that would not be possible if it faces enemies who 
employ force. The Sangha83 contains multiple voices and viewpoints, some in opposition to 
each other, but there has long been a tension inherent in the concept of a religion that calls for 
nonviolence, using violence to ‘protect’ itself from enemies.84  
The democratically elected Rajapakse government, the victorious armed forces and a 
co-opted Buddhist nationalism were unhindered in their efforts to construct a narrative that 
demonized Tamils and portrayed the LTTE as a group that could not be negotiated with, only 
destroyed.85 This occurred through nationalist discourse that elevated the mythological and 
historical importance of Sri Lanka as a pure land that preserves the Buddha’s teachings whilst 
emphasizing a victim mentality whereby the island has suffered at the hands of a series of 
invaders, including Tamils from India, Portuguese, Dutch and of course the British and now 
from Muslims. The cessation of the war permitted a resurgence of Sinhalese nationalism, which 
exulted in the long-overdue vanquishing of the LTTE terrorists but also denied other minorities 
their own suffering in the conflict. Muslim communities in the North and East suffered terribly 
in the war from LTTE atrocities of mass murder and ethnic cleansing86, and are now victimized 
by an aggressive Buddhist nationalism from certain extremists under a very similar ideology of 
purity and ethno-nationalism.  
The interview respondents overwhelmingly claim that although the war was won, 
conflict persists in Sri Lanka. Several discuss in detail the idea that conflict in Sri Lanka never 
ceased, only the State is now engaged in fighting a different enemy. Respondents explicitly 
drew causal linkages between the devastating civil war and the recent ethno-religious violence. 
Muslims have replaced Tamils in the media and popular discourse as the greatest perceived 
threat to national stability and prosperity. The civil war was fought by enemies who had 
mutually incompatible and non-negotiable political positions, ensuring that facilitating any 
mediation or peace processes would be extremely challenging. The state’s ultimate military 
victory and perceived collective punishment of Tamil civilians that bypassed any negotiated 
and mediated solutions, served as a clear reminder that bellicose rhetoric and concentrated 
armed force proved to be more effective tools to defeat the LTTE than any previous peace talks 
or dialogue. Sri Lanka’s political and military elites have continued to view the civil war and 
its termination through a purely conflict lens,87 diminishing opportunities for meaningful 
reconciliation. ‘The government’s argument for this is: need constant vigilance, to prevent 
LTTE returning. Need to protect national security... [and] create this ‘threat’ in the minds of 
the people.’88  
Religion as a pivotal foundation of social identity is highly important and growing in 
Sri Lanka, especially outside urban areas. ‘Religiosity is high… it’s easy to approach people 
through faith… Faith is one of the main ways to mobilize and inspire people in Lanka’.89 As a 
mostly traditional and hierarchical society, it has ‘limited identity roles’ for people90 and faith 
as a marker of ethnic identity has become more prominent.  
The Muslim respondents all argued that since 2009 accusations and allegations against 
Muslim Sri Lankans have increased. Two prevalent domestic criticisms against Muslims relate 
to their high demographic growth and establishment of lucrative businesses, but as one (non-
Muslim) respondent suggests,91 even if these charges were accurate, neither is illegal. The 
double accusation that Muslims are rapidly increasing in number and are often successful 
entrepreneurs points to deep-seated concerns of inadequacy on the part of the accusers, and the 
charge that Muslims are increasing rapidly in number is not supported by official census 
statistics.92 One Buddhist monk argues against the prejudice facing Muslims, claiming that: 
  
A well-known argument is Muslims don’t use birth control, as it’s against their religion, 
and this is easy to believe. The evidence from other countries shows birth rate is 
connected to education and women’s rights, not just religion. So the Muslim high birth 
rate is due to their social economic situation …when Buddhists are told that Muslims’ 
numbers are growing, and Buddhists will be in minority soon, people believe this.93  
 
Social divisions during the war were mostly split ethnically between Sinhalese and Tamil, but 
now divisions are more likely to be faith-based. ‘In the future…. ethnic conflict will not be the 
main conflict, it will be religious’, states a Catholic Priest.94 Conversely, respondents of all 
faiths concur that Islamic dress in Sri Lanka has altered over recent years. Muslims’ dress in 
Colombo for example, is now more visibly Arab-influenced, with more women wearing hijabs 
and niqabs. This can easily feed into charges that Muslims have increased in number in the 
Colombo area purely because they are more visibly Islamic. Two Muslim interviewees95 
highlight how Sri Lankan Islam differs from that in Pakistan and Arab countries, but this very 
visible change in clothing strengthens accusations that Muslims seek to make Sri Lanka more 
like the Middle East through their move away from the traditional Lankan garments that they 
wore previously. The causes of such changes in clothing are complex and deserve further 
examination.  
More Muslim umbrella organizations have emerged in recent years as an overt response 
to Buddhist extremism and prejudice.96 Such organizations advise self-preservation and safety 
over pressuring the government or agitating for rights and freedoms. There is a belief that if 
Muslims react to recent attacks, even non-violently, it will provoke more attacks from 
extremists.97 There are very few demonstrable linkages between these Sri Lankan organizations 
and others of a similar type from the Middle East. Likewise, there is little concrete evidence of 
violent Islamic extremism in Sri Lanka, despite the claims of some Parliamentarians and media 
outlets.98  
Organizations like the BBS can enhance existing domestic fears of Muslims and 
Islamic ideologies, which are likewise influenced by global events, in particular the anti-
minority massacres and victimization occurring in several Muslim-majority countries. Buddhist 
extremists refer to ethnic cleansing of Christians in the Middle East99 or Buddhists being 
targeted in Bangladesh and elsewhere, to illustrate what might happen in Sri Lanka if Muslim 
expansion is not contained. Such fears play into local Buddhist perceptions of insecurity and 
being overwhelmed. As Christians are often better educated and internationally connected, they 
tend to feel more secure and embedded as an integral part of Sri Lankan society, enjoying a 
position of authority and influence that remains from colonial times.100 There is growing 
interfaith activity happening, yet Muslim and Christian organizations appear to be less involved 
in politics, particularly at the national level.101 People from different ethnicities ‘will generally 
be separate. [They] don’t mind being together, but wouldn’t do it normally. On their own, they 
wouldn’t intermingle’, claims a Catholic Priest.102 Muslim respondents report a tendency to 
isolate themselves and engage less in intercommunal relations.103 They also make reference to 
the perceived anti-Muslim discrimination globally104 which justifies and legitimates public 
sentiment and even violence against Muslims in a country such as Sri Lanka.  
 
A Buddhist monk states,  
 
Originally, in Sinhalese versus Tamil conflicts, Muslims were victims. But since 2009, 
other conflict dynamics come to the fore. During the war, these were overlooked. But 
now these are more visible, such as attacks on Muslims. We need intelligence to 
understand this. Society is still infused with military thinking; violence is still part of 
Lankan society. After conflict, [we] need to discharge the mindset of conflict, but this 
hasn’t happened in Sri Lanka. Government says they did reconciliation, but not really 
[sic]. Society still retains some violent elements. It still hold impacts of the war.105  
 
Muslims report being prosecuted for offences that are overlooked by the Police if they were 
committed by Buddhists,106 indicating entrenched legal impunity coupled with a lack of 
political will to implement the law and the Constitution. ‘Muslims are across the island, but 
often in small communities… if they react [to Buddhist oppression], there will be a big clash 
against them.’107 Several respondents argue the importance of achieving some level of internal 
peace before engaging with others. But within faiths, local people often don’t want their leaders 
engaging in interfaith dialogue, particularly Muslims.108 A Catholic priest emphasizes the 
importance for minority groups to understand and be sensitive to the needs of the Buddhist 
majority, which can perceive itself as a minority.109 Various respondents of different faiths 
similarly suggest that minorities should be more sensitive to how their actions are perceived by 
Buddhists, a majority group that often feels persecuted.  
 
6. Post-war relations, the state and the media  
 
The pessimistic mood of many respondents reflects uncertainties and insecurities in Sri Lanka 
about the likelihood of further ethnic riots and violence. These fears were realized in 2018 with 
further outbreaks of anti-Muslim rioting, albeit on a smaller scale than the 2014 violence. One 
major discussion point emerging from the interviews refers to a direct causal relationship 
between the civil war and post-war ethnic violence, with widespread agreement that the United 
People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) government was heavily implicated and benefited from 
interfaith and interethnic strife. This was the political party in power from 2005 to 2015 under 
President Rajapakse. One charge that was stated repeatedly is that the BBS operated with tacit 
acceptance or even encouragement from the UPFA, which is an extremely delicate issue 
domestically. One indicator of this sensitivity is the domestic media blackout imposed by the 
GoSL surrounding the 2014 riots.110 After the bloodshed of the war, the UPFA had lost 
significant popularity with Lankan minorities. Very few Tamils supported it, and the Buddhist 
vote bank was also divided. In an effort to strengthen the Sinhalese Buddhist vote bank, the 
UPFA employed fear and scapegoating to mobilize against internal ‘enemies.’111  ‘If Buddhism 
has a common enemy, then the Buddhists will be united against the threat and vote to keep the 
UPFA in power.’112 Individuals, especially within the Sangha, faced severe challenges speaking 
out against the state or the prevailing UPFA ideology.113 
 
A Muslim scholar argues, 
 
Why does the Lankan government tolerate BBS? They are aware that Lankan 
minorities, including Muslims, will not support this current government. If there were 
elections, the current government has to depend on Sinhalese Buddhist votes. So to 
enhance the vote bank they need to show strong Buddhist policies, to show strongly 
pro-majority, not pro-minority. Laws give protections to minorities, so the government 
needs to work against this to send a message.114  
 
‘Politicians create divisions and benefit from divided communities. There are no initiatives 
from the top for communal harmony. Politicians interfere and disrupt peacebuilding 
activities’.115 This is a direct accusation that the government was actively undermining its own 
legal frameworks in an effort to win the next election. However, in January 2015 a new 
government was elected, led by President Sirisena and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, whose 
policies were more reconciliatory towards ethnic minorities.    
As a senior monk says, ‘war victory creates hatred’116. The interview respondents 
explicitly linked the legacies of the civil war with the recent ethnic riots, with the militarization 
of society and the normalization of violence as a problem-solving tool. ‘BBS is not the main 
problem, it’s a symptom of larger problems’, claims another monk.117 Following the 
overwhelming defeat of the LTTE and subjugation of many Tamil civilians, faith groups and 
civil society organisations report118 that they are worried about the direction of the 
government’s approach to inter-communal relations. ‘It took 30 years to finish the LTTE 
conflict. It could erupt again, if minorities are not accommodated’.119  
The Muslims respondents in particular were understandably critical of the enabling 
environment allowing Buddhist extremism. ‘The BBS could not operate without tacit 
government acceptance, and the media gives prominence to BBS and extremist groups.’120 
‘BBS hate speech is not censored’,121 whereas similar inflammatory remarks from Muslims are 
punished. The violent incidents in Aluthgama and elsewhere were generally not carried out by 
local people, but by outsiders that were brought in on busses organised by the BBS.122 
The importance of interfaith dialogue and outreach has often been overlooked in 
Islamic communities.123 However, the recent ethnic riots have highlighted the importance of 
interfaith dialogue for self-preservation and to build stable and peaceful societies. Interviewees 
report a significant increase in Muslim engagement in interfaith dialogue following the end of 
the civil war and from witnessing its positive impacts when carried out by other faiths, even if 
‘some people nowadays are frightened by interfaith dialogue’.124 People who are unfamiliar 
with interfaith programmes tend to be mistrustful. Regarding one interfaith dialogue 
programme, ‘Muslims said it’s a Buddhist initiative; Buddhists said it’s a Muslim initiative! 
[leading to] lots of suspicion’.125  
Local Buddhists who do engage with interfaith activities are pressured to desist by 
right-wing monks.126 Even if Buddhist monks start to participate, as staff from one interfaith 
peacebuilding NGO explain, ‘some monks are told they will be excluded from Buddhist rituals 
etc, so they become afraid… and withdraw from interfaith dialogue initiatives.’127 Similarly, a 
monk in the focus group128 explained how one senior monk and his followers were leading ‘a 
peace meditation group in Polonaruwa129, and some monks protested it, [but] they weren’t BBS, 
not as extreme… they thought this event was to support the LTTE.’ Some positive stories of 
interfaith activities emerged. A Muslim peacebuilding activist explained how,  
 
One day after the [Aluthgama] violence, I called a monk to go there together. Curfew 
[was] in place. We went to Muslim area of displaced people. People were angry against 
the BBS. [We intended] to show people that a monk wants to see them and listen to 
them, to show that not all monks are BBS. Also to show Buddhists that not all Muslims 
are fanatics.130  
 
A Buddhist monk and a Muslim preacher in the focus group131 described how,  
 
After Aluthgama, we wanted to make sure [such violence] will not happen in Galle, so 
we got Muslim reactions. When they first see a monk, the Muslim community get 
belligerent at first. Then they handled it calmly and peacefully, and the Muslim leaders 
appreciated that monks had come to visit them. The Muslim preacher followed up by 
calling his people in the village, and found out the problem was not the presence of the 
monks, but some intra-religious disputes within the Muslim community. Tension is 
how people reacted to the monks’ visit.132  
 
However, such peacebuilding actions appear isolated, and require exceptional levels of bravery 
and self-sacrifice. One major insight from the interviews concerns the similarities between 
respondents from different faiths, and significant agreement across a range of issues, which 
may indicate the temperament of religious leaders involved in peacebuilding work who are 
willing to be interviewed on such topics. ‘Faith agencies have no political goal, only to bring 
together warring factions… but their efforts are limited and are stopped, when other forces 
become more powerful: political, business, military’.133  
Particularly following the Aluthgama riots, laypeople and monks were afraid to draw 
attention to themselves, so they tended to stay quiet and only very senior monks can expect to 
be above criticism.134 As one senior monk explains, most monks receive little secular education 
and have an inadequate understanding of modern socio-political realities:  
 
The monks’ cultural exposure is too limited at present. They don’t understand other 
cultures. They are Sinhalese educated only, so don’t have a broad enough outlook. They 
cannot understand Tamil or English, so don’t relate to Lankan ethnic minorities. So 
most monks are easily swayed by politicians. JHU came to power stating Buddhism is 
in danger from non-Buddhist peoples, from outside elements. JHU wants to make 
Dhammadipa,135 but do nothing to promote monks’ education. JHU would not benefit 
from more educated monks!136  
 
Much modern Buddhist teaching in Sri Lanka is not grounded in real world concerns and 
Dhamma137 teachings tend to remain at an abstract level. ‘[We] need to change monks first, 
then the general public’, claims a senior monk.138 These observations tend to be linked to 
accusations that monks are too far removed from everyday realities to provide consistent and 
applicable guidance to address the worries and grievances of laypeople:  
 
The clergy have little concept of social responsibility… and live in the past…. It’s too 
easy to blame monks. Many monks don’t get time to do Dhamma practice, too many 
worldly issues. Monks leave behind their families, but then have to take on 
responsibility for many families (deaths, births etc). So many worldly demands on 
them, no time or energy for spiritual matters.139  
 
Monks working for peaceful change in communities may find themselves labelled 
LTTE supporters or Muslim apologists.140 For example, during a post-war multiethnic Sport 
Week, representatives from three faiths attended, but no Buddhist monks as they were afraid of 
their names coming into disrepute through association with peacebuilding activities.141 While 
‘monks have an undue amount of political power and are connected to state power structures’ 
suggests a Muslim scholar,142 a Catholic Father claims ‘there is a shortage of monks able and 
willing to stand up for peace.’143 There is thus a lack of mainstream criticism against BBS, 
including from within the Sangha: ‘The Police and local people are afraid to take action against 
the robe, as it represents the sacred Sangha.’144 
The domestic media excludes peaceful voices while providing considerable exposure 
for the more right-wing monks.145 A Muslim preacher states, ‘Media give prominence to BBS 
and extremist groups, [there’s] no balanced reporting. They don’t report voices of peace. People 
see the media and believe this one-sided version.’146 The media has a prominent role in 
instigating violence, and is accused of selective reporting.147 The mainstream media appears 
biased and reports extensively on government achievements and suffering of Buddhists: ‘Media 
and politicians only report the violence. Make too much out of small violent incidents, [they] 
exaggerate it. Only report what is going wrong... every TV channel is affiliated to a political 
party’.148 A senior Catholic Father explains, ‘the media is under intimidation. Some reporters 
now in exile, some killed, some threatened… those who stay on and survive… need self-
imposed censorship.’149  
The Rajapakse government showed little interest in conflict transformation or 
peacebuilding, only a triumphalist, security-focused style of post-conflict celebrations built on 
Sinhalese Buddhist ascendancy.150 ‘The government spent a lot on war, but spent little on 
peace…. No recognition of reconciliation needs, people’s grievances etc.’151 Sri Lankan people 
in general live with significant levels of fear152 as a result of the forced disappearances, erosion 
of free speech, state violence and so on. Muslim respondents were generally more pessimistic 
about the possibilities for a peaceful Sri Lanka, an attitude which stems from the recent riots 
and Muslim victimization during the war. Illustrating the militarization and securitization of 
Lankan society, the military often responds to incidents when it is theoretically a Police matter, 
as the GoSL needed to keep the army occupied and justify its existence after the war finished. 
“We are a militarized country. We see tanks and army everywhere, but we don’t realise it. 
Militarization is taking place.’153  
 
One of the Buddhist monks explains,  
Their [military] presence helps control the population. Don’t need guns; uniform and 
presence is enough to send a message. Society is charged; Police and army shoot more 
openly. This started after 2009. Military has changed role in society, since 2009.’154  
 
Under the pretext of protecting Sinhalese people, the GoSL established army camps inside 
many villages,155 and yet the Police have ignored attacks on Muslim homes and shops.156 
Religious actors need to be very careful how they frame their actions and to what extent they 
can be critical of the GoSL. Interview respondents describe the risk they face of being targeted 
by extremists as a result of their peacebuilding activities. The GoSL employed a range of 
obstacles to reduce the peaceful impacts of faith actors, ranging from a complete lack of 
support, to overt hindering of activities. Even for senior monks, outspoken criticism of the 
GoSL may not be possible. One respondent157 was once invited to a live programme on state 
TV, in June 2014, following the Aluthgama incident. He was told discussants would be able to 
debate the riots and how to prevent further outbreaks of violence. But when he arrived there, 
he was ordered not to mention names, or locations, or even refer to the incident. He was only 
permitted to provide an overview of Buddhism and explain how leniently Buddha viewed other 
religions.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
The socio-ethnic tensions in modern Sri Lanka need to be contextualized with regard to the 
social changes resulting from the civil war, and the promotion in mainstream discourse of a 
monolithic national identity. One of the principal claims emphasized repeatedly by interviewees 
is that Sri Lanka’s conflict history and the social impacts of a prolonged civil war helped create 
the conditions for the anti-Muslim ethnic riots of 2014, among other violent incidents and 
oppressions. The war exacerbated social divisions and cemented identities along ethnic and 
religious lines, hindering an inclusive Sri Lankan national identity that all citizens could 
equitably claim and contribute to. Returning here to the research question, ‘what causal 
mechanisms link a post-war environment with religious and nationalist extremism, and how 
can this lead to outbreaks of ethnic rioting?, the interview data strongly indicates that the war 
in itself was not a sufficient cause for subsequent ethnic violence, but that the post-conflict 
ethnic and political polarization facilitated the emergence of extremist ideologies and a tacit 
acceptance of the use of violence against specific minority groups. These factors include the 
style and tone of post-war political discourse, particularly in the mainstream media, linked with 
governmental consent of extremist organizations’ presence and influence. These factors occur 
in a wider socio-political environment that has witnessed numerous examples of collective 
violence against minorities over recent decades. Overall, the interview respondents refer to 
events and activities under two distinct but interlinked topics:  
 
1) Following a decisive military victory, the absence of any reconciliation process or 
peacebuilding efforts, or at the minimum an official acknowledgement of wartime sufferings, 
allows for ethno-national divides to be re-emphasized and re-drawn;  
 
2) The promotion in public discourse of a monolithic ethno-nationalist identity has 
repercussions for ethnic minorities. This division can then facilitate and trigger acts of 
collective violence.  
 
The socio-political uncertainty in Sri Lanka has been both caused and co-opted by elements in 
government, and people close to government, that seek to amplify the potential for ethnic 
violence. The efficacy and usefulness of violence has been proven; its role in society amply 
demonstrated in the final defeat of the LTTE after decades of military failures and perceived 
capitulation. The absence of a sincere reconciliation or truth-finding commission, which is 
partial and ineffective, hinders peacebuilding and recovery from the damaging legacies of civil 
war. The state’s comprehensive military victory legitimized violence as an effective political 
tool and social norm, whose impacts continue after the overt conflict has ceased. The interview 
respondents argue that the UPFA administration did not do enough to win the peace, or 
adequately include ethnic minorities in post-conflict Sri Lanka, or guarantee Tamils and 
Muslims their place in mainstream pluralistic society. 
A nation beset by perceived threats, both internal and external, has need of identifiable 
enemies and scapegoats; Muslims have supplanted the LTTE as the new target for violent 
nationalism and extremism. A compliant mass media and the silencing of dissenting voices 
have further permitted mass mobilization against minorities, with ethnic rioting one visible 
consequence of this. All of the Buddhist monks interviewed highlighted the Buddha’s teaching 
of compassion and nonviolence. They describe how the BBS has perverted this teaching into 
justifying violence, ostensibly with the aim of protecting the Dhammadipa, the land of Buddhist 
teaching, from non-Buddhist threats. Paradoxically, the Buddhist extremists’ singular view of 
Sri Lankan ethno-national identity has much in common with similar philosophies espoused by 
extremists from other religions elsewhere in the world. The interviewees express pessimism 
about various obstacles to peace: the government repression, mainstream media, impunity for 
nationalist and Buddhist extremist groups, repeated acts of organized civil violence and the 
potential for further outbreaks of ethnic riots.  
These findings challenge the narrative that mobilization for ethno-religious violence 
depends on radical interpretations of scripture, and instead indicate the salience of the ethno-
political context. Buddhist extremism may have roots in the origin myths of Sri Lanka’s 
religious and secular history, but the street violence of recent years, some of which is apparently 
orchestrated or at least supported by fanatical monks, adds to the argument that such ideologies 
are not primarily based on contested interpretations of historical scripture but on ethnic tensions 
and grievances, linked to a political structure that minorities feel does not represent them 
adequately. The continued militarization of society and a triumphalist political discourse sustain 
conflictual social relations that lead to further rhetoric against minorities and outbreaks of 
organized violence. 
In the absence of any state-led reconciliation efforts, one mechanism to reduce further 
violent conflict is interfaith dialogue and promotion of fraternity between ethnic groups. Sri 
Lanka’s progress from fractured and conflicted social relations to genuine post-conflict 
transformation will require concerted political will and a demonstration from all ethno-religious 
groups that multi-ethnic heterogeneity and diversity is in the country’s long-term interests. The 
interviewees share some optimism that ethnic and national identity conflicts are not intractable; 
although they are extremely difficult, and the rise of Buddhist extremism is deeply problematic, 
at the same time there are multiple grassroots initiatives challenging these ideologies.  
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